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ABSTRACT
This paper reports significant new findings on banking performance by relating (i) 7 bank-
specific measures, (ii) 3 non-bank-specific measures with (iii) time dummy variable as 
control for financial crisis in the test period. The findings concern the performance of a 
new type of bank called the ‘participation bank’. Participation banks price their funding 
through profit-sharing contracts with customers, so deposit and lending costs are decided 
not on the basis of market interest rates as in the case of mainstream banks. A sample of 
100 participation banks covering 25 countries were selected for this study over the financial 
years 2007-2015. We used a new measure equivalent to the net interest margin called ‘profit 
share margin’, which has not been previously used to study banks. In fact, no study using 
participation banks has been carried out as yet. The dynamic panel GMM procedure was 
applied to obtain robust estimators; this is a refined econometric method that is also seldom 
applied in banking studies. The results revealed that 6 bank-specific factors statistically 
significantly affected the performance of participation banks in the test period. The paper 
also reports that the practice of including non-bank-specific factors as possibly relevant 
for performance is questionable as these were not found to be significant. The findings 
were from both OLS and GMM panel regressions providing comparison statistics with 
some past studies.  
Keywords: Bank performance, bank-specific factors, 
generalised method of moments, macroeconomic 
factors, participation banks, JEL Classification: G20, 
L20
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INTRODUCTION
This paper reports interesting new results 
from a study of a different type of bank, 
the ‘participation’ bank, which prices 
bank deposit rates and bank lending rates 
not on prevailing interest rates in the 
market but on the profit rates offered by the 
participation bank to customers (depositors 
and borrowers). This new type of bank 
evolved over the last 50 years or so, and 
has managed to survive as the new type of 
banking in 76 countries, with total assets 
amounting to US$3,800 billion in 2015 
(Ariff, Iqbal, & Mohamad, 2012)1. The 
predominant pricing method for loans by 
mainstream banks is to take bank deposits 
at a lower interest rate and then lend out 
money created from deposits made in the 
bank at higher interest rates to borrowers. 
The spread between a high lending rate and 
a lower borrowing rate is increasingly being 
used in recent studies as a popular bank 
‘performance measure’ (Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Huizinga, 1999). This spread is termed the 
NIM (net interest margin), which has been 
shown to be an excellent market-related 
performance indicator. The other long-
established performance indicators are the 
Return on Assets, ROA, and the Return on 
Equity, ROE (Akhtar, Ali, & Sadakat, 2011).
It is reasonable to infer from such 
studies that the NIM is a more market-
responsive rubbery variable that shrinks and 
expands as liquidity of a banking system 
expands or contracts over time, for example, 
from money supply changes and/or portfolio 
rebalancing actions of economic agents. 
Money supply is known to have an impact 
on bank liquidity, which passes through the 
intermediation process, thereby significantly 
affecting bank asset prices (Badarudin, 
Ariff, & Khalid, 2013). 
How do more smoothed2 performance 
measures such as the ROA or ROE 
compare with the NIM as the market-
relevant performance proxy? This is indeed 
another interesting research question, 
if we use the NIM (or its equivalent for 
particiaption banks). This is a question of 
some importance to the banking industry 
as it has not been adequately addressed in a 
comparative study to date. 
Another new issue, which has still not 
been addressed is the manner in which 
banks price funding in ways different from 
using interest rate, therefore, using NIM 
in funding decisions. The use of interest 
rate as the pricing mechanism to determine 
lending and also borrowing rates is a well 
entrenched practice from ancient times and 
1 This is about 1.5% of the total assets of banks 
as reported in the BI.S, in Basel. Hence, this 
new type of bank is slowly taking root where it 
can find customers. 
2 Income smoothing is very heavily practiced 
by firms in order to convey more balanced 
information over time to investors. In years 
when a firm’s incomes grow rapidly or when 
incomes decline rapidly, accountants choose 
standards of reporting to lower the earnings or 
increase the earnings in respective time periods. 
This practice is termed ‘income smoothing’ 
in accounting literature. ROA and ROE are 
smoothed numbers whereas the NIM is very 
largely dependent on market-based interest 
rates. 
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is now vastly expanded in modern banking 
practice, especially with widely used 
benchmarks such as the LIBOR etc. There 
is a new way of pricing funds as paractised 
by participation banks. The return to bank 
deposit holders is determined on the basis 
of pre-agreed profit-share so the amount of 
rewards to bank depositors is a share of the 
profits made by the bank through the process 
of money creation to lend on the basis of 
profit-shared contracts entered ex ante with 
the borrowers of money (see the Appendix 
for performance history of participation 
banks). 
This method is different from that 
based on interest rate; it is based on a profit-
shared-margin (PSM) on which time series 
information is now available from central 
bank sources3. This variable is equivalent to 
the NIM, which has historically dominated 
the banking sector. PSM-based pricing of 
bank funding relies upon the newer form 
of lending and borrowing conducted by 
particiaption banks. Participation banks hold 
an estimated total assets of US$3,800 billion, 
which is no more than 1.5% of the total assets 
of mainstream banks. Several researchers 
have used accounting profitability measures 
as the banking perfomance measure to 
study this new type of bank such as Akhtar 
et al. (2011) and Bashir (2003). As far as 
our search of literature showed, there has 
been no published paper using PSM as a 
measure of participation bank performance. 
There is also a need to investigate how the 
accounting profitability measures such 
as ROA compares with the PSM as an 
alternative measure. 
Thus, this paper reports findings from a 
large sample of participation banks that use 
PSM as the pricing mechanism in managing 
banking funds. The study covers this form 
of banking from 25 countries, where this 
type of banking has become well-entrenched 
over the several decades since the inception 
in 1963 of the first particiaption banks (Ariff 
et al., 2012). The findings reported in this 
paper are interesting and new for this new 
type of bank. While the accounting-based 
profitability is an excellent variable, it is 
also evident from our findings that PSM is a 
better alternative as well especially when an 
industry is not fully competitive as is likely 
to be the case with participation banks with 
small-sized and less experienced banks.
The rest of the paper is divided into 
five sections. An extensive literature 
review on what determines banking 
performance, using NIM or ROA or ROE, 
is sumamrised in the next section. The 
ensuing methodology section explains the 
data soources, variables and test models 
for our study of the association between 
PSM or ROA (performance measures) 
and the several determinants of bank 
performance already found in the literature. 
3 For details on the legal basis of participation 
or Islamic banking, see Ariff, et al. (2012). 
There is a growing body of literature that 
suggests that PSM-based pricing of funding by 
banks is closely related to the profitability of the 
banks themselves as well as the borrowers, who 
consider the profit-and-shared lending by banks 
aligns loan servicing with the performance of 
the economy, and therefore, promotes system-
wide stability.   
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The findings are presented in three sub-
sections: overall findings are presented first 
before showing the sub-group results for 
high-income and low-income economies. 
Performance persistence is discussed in 
another sub-section before the paper ends 
with a concluding section.
BANKING PERFORMANCE 
LITERATURE
Internal Factors
A number of models have been developed 
by researchers to investigate the relationship 
between bank performance and a large 
number of (i) bank-specific (ii) industry-
level and (iii) macroeconomic variables 
as being significantly correlated. For bank 
performance, researchers have used NIM, 
ROA and ROE as indicators. For the factors 
that may be related to performance, many 
variables have been used. Among them 
are: average operating costs, competition, 
market risk and credit risk. In their paper, Ho 
and Saunders (1981) showed that the interest 
spread (NIM) is significantly correlated 
with the level to which bank managers seek 
to avoid risk, the magnitude of transaction 
operations undertaken, the structure of the 
bank market and changes in interest rates. 
There are several more factors. 
Ho and Saunders’ paper was expanded 
by McShane and Sharpe (1985), who 
included operating costs and a measure 
for competition. Allen (1988) introduced 
various types of loan and deposit, while 
Angbazo (1997) added credit risk to the 
model while Maudos and De Guevara (2004) 
incorporated operation costs. Saunders and 
Schumacher (2000) suggested that interest 
rates, opportunity cost, market power, the 
bank’s capital-to-assets ratio and fluctuations 
in interest rates all have significant effects 
on the NIM. It should be noted that these 
are not, in our view, the main factors driving 
bank performance. We propose to divide the 
factors into internal (meaning bank-specific) 
and external (industry and economy-wide) 
factors in the ensuing discussion.
Liquidity risk. Deep and Schaefer (2004) 
devised a liquidity transformation measure 
termed by them as ‘liquidity transformation 
gap’. This is computed as the difference 
between liquid liabilities and illiquid assets 
scaled by total assets. They argued that 
banks do not create much liquidity. Berger 
and Bouwman (2009) reported that capital 
is positively and significantly associated 
with liquidity in larger banks, but it is less 
important for average-sized banks while it is 
negative for small-sized banks. Distinguin, 
Roulet and Tarazi (2013) reported that 
European and American commercial banks 
decrease their regulatory capital coincidence 
as they create liquidity, meaning that they 
finance their assets with their liabilities. 
Shen, Chen, Kao and Yeh, (2009) showed a 
significant link between bank performance 
and risk of bank liquidity as the higher 
cost of funds may reduce a bank’s profit 
but increases net interest margin. Bourke 
(1989) stated there is a positive relationship 
between liquidity and bank performance, but 
left out details found in Bouwman’s paper.
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Credit risk.  Ahmad and Ariff (2007) 
stated that an increase in a bank’s provision 
for loan losses is a significant determinant 
of potential credit risk, which means that 
credit risk is probably the most important 
risk for a bank. Athanasoglou, Bisimis 
and Delis (2008) suggested that the risks 
for banks have important effects on their 
profitability. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(1999) reported positive effects from credit 
risk on NIM, while Kasman, Tung, Vardar 
and Okan (2010) showed credit risk is 
positively linked to banks’ NIM. Srairi 
(2009) worked on participation banks, 
showing that performance is correlated with 
capital adequacy and credit risk. 
Capital adequacy. Based on recent capital 
provision theories, more capital makes 
for better bank performance and is more 
predictable; in fact, the post-2008 financial 
crisis reform efforts including Basel III 
are premised on this important fact about 
banking. Banks with more capital tend 
to have enhanced security so their assets 
are safer. Also, such banks monitor their 
borrowers strongly because they seek to 
reduce the probability of default. Demirguc-
Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and Garcia-
Herrero, Gavilá and Santabárbara (2009) 
both reported a positive correlation between 
bank performance and capital provision. 
Naceur and Goaied (2008) also reported 
a positive association between capital 
provision and bank performance measured 
as NIM and profitability. Beltratti and Stulz 
(2009) found that banks with relatively 
superior Tier-1 capital and more deposit 
financing capacity had higher returns in 
times of crisis. Capital is a prominent 
factor of bank profitability in the study of 
Athanasoglou et al. (2008). Naceur and 
Omran (2011) showed that a bank’s NIM is 
affected by individual bank characteristics 
such as credit risk and capital provision. 
Bashir (2003), Sufian and Parman (2009) 
studied participation bank profitability and 
reported a positive relationship with the 
capital provision.
Asset quality. In some studies, assets quality 
was proxied in the same way as credit risk 
or loan-loss provision but asset quality was 
a factor that was achieved over time and 
through service. Thus, it is expected that 
older banks will have better-quality assets, 
resulting in a good reputation. Moreover, 
in some cases, loans are not key assets that 
create the main part of the income. A bank’s 
profits may be determined by the quality 
of its loan portfolio and the risks that it 
carries. Therefore, non-performing loans 
being outweighed by sound loans indicate 
high quality of portfolio. It is the most 
obvious concern for banks to ensure a low 
level of impaired loans. Hassan Al-Tamimi 
(2006) studied UAE commercial banks and 
stated that bank portfolio combination and 
bank size are highly significantly correlated 
with bank performance. Australian banks’ 
resilience is argued to arise from higher loan 
quality from responsible lending practices. 
Nazir (2010) applied CAMEL parameters 
to evaluate the financial performance of 
the two major banks operating in northern 
India. The banks have shown significant 
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performance. They concluded that low 
non-performing loans to total loans are a 
sign of good health of the portfolio of a 
bank since lower ratio indicates better bank 
performance.
Managerial efficiency. Numerous cases 
of bank failure in the last two decades 
have occurred. The empirical literature 
identified two main reasons for bank failure: 
a large number of impaired loans and an 
adverse situation regarding cost efficiency. 
A fundamental dispute is on whether or not 
poor administration increases the chances 
of bank collapse. Based on the assumption 
of poor-management, cost efficiency has 
an impact on impaired loans due to the 
lack of precise supervision of loans. In 
other words, low operational efficiency is 
a sign of poor management, and this will 
affect credit decisions. In order to enhance 
bank efficiency, it is necessary to have 
efficient cost control, along with a change 
in workplace culture, meaning that if banks 
meaningfully improve their managerial 
practices, they will benefit greatly.
Williams’ (2004) findings supported 
poor-management theory. He explained 
that a decline in efficiency is usually 
followed by a decline in loan quality. Rossi, 
Schwaiger and Winkler (2005) also showed 
similar results over a longer time period. 
Goddard, Liu, Molyneux and Wilson (2013) 
reported that managerial efficiency appeared 
to be a more important determinant of 
bank performance while in another study 
(Athanasoglou et al., 2008), it was found 
that bank profit was closely but negatively 
related to operating expenses. Mokhtar, 
Abdullah and Alhabshi (2008) argued that 
participation banks were less efficient than 
conventional banks. Masood, Aktan and 
Chowdhary (2009) reported a significant 
effect of operational efficiency on bank 
profitability in Saudi Arabia for the period 
1999-2007. 
Bank size. In some studies, size and 
performance were closely but inversely 
related to each other. Essentially, it was 
anticipated that large banks would have a 
higher level of loan quality and be able to 
diversify their services more than smaller 
banks, which reduces their risk. In addition, 
banks benefitted from economies of scale. 
Therefore, a reduction in risk because of 
diversity and benefits from economy of scale 
due to larger size can lead to the enhanced 
performance of a bank. Moreover, the recent 
global financial crisis has shown that the 
size of a bank is connected to substantial 
risk regarding financing the activities 
of society. Conversely, once banks have 
become very large, due to some reasons such 
as an increase in overhead costs, they may 
experience negative performance.
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2011) 
measured the size of banks using total 
assets and called it ‘absolute size’, while the 
other variable was called ‘systemic size’ as 
liabilities over GDP. They suggested that 
banks with a large absolute size are often 
much more profitable while, in contrast, 
banks with a large systemic size have less 
profit. Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) 
found a negative association with size. 
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Naceur and Goaied (2008) reported similar 
findings. Others have suggested a weak or 
non-existent correlation between size and 
bank performance (e.g. Goddard et al., 2004; 
Micco, Paniza & Yanez, 2007; Cornett, 
McNett & Tehranian, 2010). Akhtar et al. 
(2011), who studied participation banks in 
Pakistan in the period 2006-09, found that 
bank size affected performance negatively. 
Income diversification. As a definition 
of non-interest revenue, we refer to the 
so-called non-traditional activities. Due 
to the changes in the banking industry and 
increased competition, non-interest income 
has been the centre of attention for banks. In 
most income-related studies, diversification 
has been considered as non-interest income 
that increases over time. Most importantly, 
it is assumed that income diversification 
can, logically, reduce bankruptcy. Busch and 
Kick (2009) analysed the determinants of 
non-interest income in Germany and argued 
for the impact of the cross-subsidisation of 
interest and fee-based business activities. 
Williams and Rajaguru (2007) examined the 
relationship between fee-based income and 
interest margin in Australia. Their results 
supported fee-based business income as 
being able to serve as an alternative when 
there is a decline in interest income. We 
expect a negative correlation between NIM 
and non-interest income. 
It should be noted that most previous 
studies have tested only one or two factors 
connected with profitability. In our study, we 
aimed to test a large number of variables as 
direct factors in participation banks. Further, 
we intended to include external factors as 
explained in the next sub-section. These are 
annual data that are entered in a panel setting 
while the data on direct factors are used 
across the sample of banks in this study.
External Factors
The literature also suggested factors that 
are not bank-specific in nature: taxes, 
quality of industry service and so on. In our 
view, industry and macroeconomic factors 
have been studied by some researchers 
(Demirguc-Kunt & Huizingha, 1999). For 
the study of a single country, as in their 
study, it would be irrelevant to include these. 
However, in our panel setting, our model 
could include these external variables as 
control variables in order to ensure that the 
inclusion of these non-bank-specific factors 
improved the accuracy of our measures of 
the bank-specific factors.
Market structure. There are two well-
known theories regarding the relationship 
between bank concentration and NIM, 
described as the structure-conduct-
performance (market power) theory and 
as the efficient-structure (ES) theory. The 
first theory states that increased market 
power results in monopoly power, while the 
second theory attributes higher profitability 
to superior efficiency. Goddard et al. (2011) 
and Mirzaei, Liu and Moore (2013) showed 
findings in support of the first theory while 
the following studies showed no support 
for that theory: Staikouras and Wood 
(2004),  Mamatzakis and Remoundos 
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(2003), Athanasoglou et al. (2008), Naceur 
and Goaied (2008) and Chortareas, Garza-
García and Girardone (2012).  
Growth in GDP. There are no conclusive 
findings regarding the effect of economic 
growth on bank performance. There are 
contrasting findings suggesting that higher-
growth scenarios promote a greater demand 
for bank loans, which could lead to higher 
charges by banks for their loans, thus 
increasing competition stability expectations 
through a lowering of interest. However, 
Claeys and Vennet (2008) found that higher 
economic growth was associated with 
higher NIM in some countries whereas 
for some other countries there was no 
such link. Bank profitability was reported 
to be positively impacted upon by output 
growth by Kosmidou (2008) and Flamini, 
McDonald and Schumacher (2009). There 
were also reports of negative effect, for 
instance by Demirguc-Kunt, Laven and 
Levine (2003), Sufian (2009), Liu and 
Wilson (2010) and Tan (2012).
Inflation. The effect of inflation on bank 
performance depends on whether operating 
expenses and revenue increase at a higher 
rate than inflation rate. The impact of 
inflation on bank profitability depends 
on whether inflation is fully anticipated. 
Inflation is one of the main channels for 
performance where it is possible to affect 
the operations and margins of banks through 
inflation affecting the interest rates. Perry 
(1992) suggested that the effect of inflation 
on bank performance is positive if the rate 
of inflation is fully anticipated. This gives 
banks the opportunity to adjust interest 
rates accordingly, consequently banks make 
higher profits. See Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999) for a study of 80 countries.
In developing a  tes t  model  for 
participation banks in our study, we made 
an a priori assumption that both the internal 
and external factors are relevant for sound 
performance of participation banks. Both 
types of bank operate in the chosen countries 
to provide intermediation services to the 
economies. Despite the differences in pricing 
of funds, participation banks compete with 
other types of bank, so in a sense, both 
types of bank serve the same market for 
funds. Hence, our assumption is not far 
off the mark that the variables affecting 
performance could well be the same set of 
factors for both types of bank.
DATA, HYPOTHESES AND 
METHODOLOGY
Data and Variables
The data for this study were accessed from 
the following sources: bank balance sheet 
and income statements as bank-specific 
observations from the BankScope database 
provided by the Fitch-IBCA and available 
at University Putra Malaysia. The data in 
the fields were checked for accuracy as 
data relating to participation banks only. 
The data were annual data as reported or as 
computed from details in the database. The 
final sample consisted of 100 participation 
banks in 25 countries that use this new type 
of banking. The profit rate margin (PSM) 
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was equivalent to the NIM for mainstream 
banks using interest rates. 
In Table 1, we provide the short-form 
notations of the variables used and define 
the variables. 
Table 1 
Variables, symbols and descriptions 
Symbols Variables Description
Dependent variables
ROA ROA The return on average total assets of the bank
ROE ROE The return on average total equity of the bank
NIM NIM The net interest margin of the bank
Bank-specific determinants (internal factors)
LR Liquidity risk Ratio of financing gap (difference between bank loan 
and customer deposit) to total assets
CR Credit risk Loan loss provisions over total loans
CA Capital adequacy Equity capital to total loans 
AQ Asset quality Non-performing loans to total loans
ME Managerial efficiency Operating expenses to total assets
ID Income diversification Non-interest income over total assets
LTA Size Natural logarithm of total assets 
Non-bank-specific factors
CONCEN Concentration 5-Bank asset concentration
GDPG GDP growth Real GDP growth
INF Inflation Annual inflation rate
We collected data to ensure that we had 
a balanced panel over eight years ending in 
2014 for all 100 banks. The variables were 
either taken as reported in the database or 
computed from other items of data in the 
database. Data on concentration, inflation 
and GDP growth were computed from the 
world development indicator reports in the 
World Bank web site. Our final sample 
covered 100 banks over eight years from 
25 countries. The variables related to 100 
banks i=100 over eight years t=8. t=8 and 
banks i=100.
The dependent variables were PSM (as 
appropriate for this type of bank) and ROA, 
both being annual numbers relating to each 
bank in the sample. Summary statistics for 
the variables are presented in Table 2.
The average ROA for all the banks in 
the test period was 1.08 (while the ROE was 
10.08%) per year. These numbers suggest 
two things. First, the ROA is substantially 
lower than the corresponding figure reported 
in the literature for developed country banks 
as being about 1.8. This is due to the larger 
capital provisions found in participation 
banks. Second, the ROE reported for Basel-
registered banks in the Basel webpage is 
13 to 31% per year over a 25-year period. 
However, our figures were for the period 
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2008-2014, that is, in the years after the 
Global financial crisis, which were noted 
for low profitability. Lower return means 
that the 10.8% for participation banks 
was due to the small size of the banks and 
the requirement that participation banks 
have more capital provision, which lowers 
the ROA. This result is thus expected as 
participation banks also operate as small-
sized banks in more risky countries with 
profit-sharing basis. Over the test period, 
the average gross domestic product growth 
rate was 4.36% while inflation was 5.87%, 
which is high.
A correlation coefficient between two 
explanatory variables exceeding the value 
of 0.8 indicates a potential problem among 
variables. The results given in the table give 
support to our conclusion that there was no 
problem of cross-correlation introducing 
errors in the estimated parameters or on 
test results. 
NIM is the net interest rate margin 
defined as the interest rate income minus 
interest rate expenses over average total 
earning assets; ROA is the return on average 
total assets; ROE is the return on average 
total shareholder equity; LR is a measure of 
liquidity risk calculated as ratio of financing 
gap (difference between bank’s loan and 
customer deposit) to total assets; CR is a 
measure of credit risk calculated as loan loss 
provisions over total loans; CA is a measure 
of capital adequacy calculated as equity 
capital to total loans; AQ is a measure of 
asset quality calculated as nonperforming 
loan over total loans; ME is a measure 
of managerial efficiency calculated as 
operating expenses to total asset; ID is a 
measure of income diversification calculated 
Table 2 
Summary statistics of 100 banks from 25 countries  
Pooled  High income country Low income country
Mean Std. 
Dev.
Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev.
Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev.
Min Max
PSM (NIM) 3.70 1.58 -4.06 8.77 3.47 1.49 -4.06 7.85 4.54 1.73 0.23 10.75
ROA 1.08 1.56 -13.91 6.21 1.15 1.61 -13.91 7.30 0.81 1.48 -8.72 4.05
ROE 10.08 11.15 -69.49 63.15 9.80 11.22 -69.49 63.15 11.47 10.85 -21.63 36.22
LR -6.20 26.03 -78.93 98.48 -2.43 25.08 -59.31 98.48 -18.36 26.26 -78.93 64.22
CR 0.96 2.44 -45.11 12.38 1.00 1.25 -2.39 12.38 1.10 1.46 -0.77 9.34
CA 26.79 38.89 -19.85 524.18 24.53 22.30 5.31 197.02 20.91 18.64 -41.75 96.81
AQ 6.08 8.12 0.02 80.42 5.60 7.41 0.02 54.44 6.99 8.69 0.17 61.60
ME 2.15 1.25 0.15 9.06 1.88 0.97 0.15 8.35 2.92 1.64 0.84 8.20
ID 1.22 1.10 -0.35 11.00 1.12 1.00 -0.18 8.13 1.37 0.88 -0.35 4.55
LTA 15.08 1.35 10.65 18.22 15.53 1.11 11.99 18.22 13.84 1.06 11.37 15.91
CONCEN 83.82 16.82 40.00 100.00 88.67 9.42 57.08 100.00 68.44 23.74 40.00 100.00
GDPG 4.36 3.54 -15.09 17.99 4.43 3.86 -7.08 17.99 4.46 2.51 -15.09 8.40
INF 5.87 5.50 -4.86 39.27 4.44 4.86 -4.86 39.27 9.79 4.84 3.96 36.91
No. of observations 497 No. of observations 368 No. of observations 123
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as non-interest income over total assets; 
LTA is a measure of size calculated as 
natural logarithm of total assets; and TA 
is total asset; CONCEN is 5-Bank asset 
concentration for each country that has 
assets of its five largest banks as a share of 
total banking asset; GDPG is GDP growth 
(annual %); INF is inflation, end of period 
consumer prices (percent change).
Table 3 is a summary of cross-
correlations among independent variables. 
It shows the dependence between variables 
and describes how strongly variables in 
the same group resemble each other. The 
correlation coefficients between each 
variable for many of them is almost low and 
none of the cross-correlation values are 0.8 
or more to seriously bias the results.
Table 3 
Correlation coefficients between independent variables 
LR CR CA AQ ME ID LTA CONCEN GDPG INF
LR 1          
CR 0.03 1         
CA 0.00 0.25 1        
AQ -0.06 0.33 0.39 1       
ME -0.06 0.34 0.35 0.34 1      
ID 0.00 -0.16 0.22 0.10 0.21 1     
LTA 0.03 -0.07 -0.17 -0.26 -0.31 -0.02 1    
CONCEN -0.05 -0.01 0.14 0.04 0.00 -0.10 0.10 1   
GDPG 0.08 -0.06 0.00 -0.08 -0.08 0.00 0.07 -0.07 1  
INF -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.25 -0.24 -0.15 -0.20 1
Test Models
The appropriate model to use based on 
the available information, balanced panel 
of time series data (T=8) and subjects 
(N=100), was the Generalised Methods of 
Moments (GMM). To enable the across-time 
dependence of banking performance on 
the prior year’s performance, we specified 
the lagged dependent variable to make the 
GMM estimate the dynamic coefficient 
to the lagged variable. The data were 
transformed to be stationary using the usual 
tests.  
The independent variables identified 
as explained in this section were entered 
as directly relevant bank-specific factors 
(there were seven items here). The non-
bank-specific variables with one datum per 
year were control variables to ensure that 
the bank-specific variables were estimated 
after controlling for the effects of these 
variables on performance. There were 
three (CONC; GDP; INF) such variables. 
In presenting the results, we provide the 
usual test statistics such as Wald tests as the 
measure of model fitness (in the case of OLS 
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results, the F-Tests and R-squared values). 
To see how the balanced panel regression 
with dynamic GMM results were derived, 
see the following: Arellano and Bond, 1991; 
Arellano and Bover, 1995; and Blundell and 
Bond, 1998. The estimators usually differed 
from the OLS estimators. We also provide 
the OLS estimates for comparison.
Empirical work on the determinants of 
bank performance potentially includes three 
sources of potential estimation errors: very 
persistent profits, endogeneity and omitted 
variables. Dynamic modelling corrects 
these problems. Using a fixed and/or 
random effect model within a panel setting 
causes some minor difficulties when lagged 
dependent or independent variables may 
influence especially in certain time periods 
or across a few banks. We have no solution 
to this problem, and it is not expected to alter 
the results very much. 
The linear dynamic panel data model 
can be specified as follows:
PERFit=c+ δPREF(it-1)+∑
j
(j=1) βj X
j
it +∑k(k=1) βkY
k
it 
+∑
L
(l=1) βl Z
l
it +εit      εit=vi+uit                          (1)
where, PREF(it-1) is the one-period lagged 
dependent variable and δ the speed 
of adjustment to equilibrium because 
of performance persistence. PERFit is 
performance of bank i at time t, with i=1,. 
. .,N, t=1,. . .,T, c is a constant term, Xit’s 
are bank-specific variables, Yit’s industry-
specific variables, Zit’s the macroeconomic 
variables and εit  is the disturbance, with vi 
the unobserved bank-specific effect while 
uit are the idiosyncratic errors. This is a 
one-way error component regression model, 
where vi ∼ (IIN(0, δ
2
v)) are independent of 
ui ∼ (IN(0, δ
2
u)).
Placing the lagged dependent variable 
on the right-hand side of the equation 
assumes this variable is correlated with the 
error term, εit , which is a function of the bank 
specific effect, vi. Due to this, the dynamic 
panel data estimates of Equation (1) suffer a 
slight bias. The estimator option in this case 
is the GMM proposed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991), which is a modification to eliminate 
the effects of a bank specific, or any time 
invariant bank specific variables, and 
endogeneity. In addition to this we are sure 
that we had stationary regresses. GMM uses 
the orthogonal condition between different 
errors and lagged dependent variable. This 
is valid under the assumptions that the 
error term is serially uncorrelated and the 
lag of the explanatory variables is weakly 
exogenous. 
Consistency of GMM estimators relies 
on two test specifications. First is the Hansen 
test, which is a test of over-identification 
restrictions. The GMM estimation of the 
dynamic panel data increases the number 
of conditions. Therefore, the Hansen test is 
conducted to test the of over-identification 
restrictions. The second test is the Arellano–
Bond order 2 test for second-order serial 
correlation in the disturbance term. Failure 
to reject the null hypothesis of both tests 
gives support to the accuracy of estimations. 
The GMM estimators are typically used 
in the one-step and two-step procedure. 
The one-step procedure uses a weighted 
matrix independent of the parameters 
estimated. The two-step GMM using the 
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optimal weighting matrix is weighted by 
a consistent covariance matrix. Because 
of this, the two-step estimator is more 
efficient than the one-step estimator. Using 
the two-step estimator has many problems 
because it easily generates instruments that 
are numerous. Windmeijer (2005) showed 
that the two-step GMM estimation with 
various instruments could lead to biased 
standard errors and parameter estimates. 
Bias in the two-step standard measures 
can be corrected by Windmeijer’s (2005) 
correction procedure, which we adopted, 
and that reduced this problem. In this study 
we implemented this correction procedure 
and got robust results.
Hypotheses Development
The central hypothesis was for the existence 
of a significant relationship between 
performance and a set of determinants from 
the literature. We tested this central issue 
and the hypotheses were: 
 Hypothesis 1. There is no significant 
relationship between the PSM (and 
then repeated with ROA in a second 
run) as dependent variable and the nine 
independent factors in the regressions. 
We expected to reject this hypothesis 
based on prior findings, so we hoped 
to have the model fit to be significant 
using F-ratio and R-squared values.
 Hypothesis 2: There is no relationship 
between PSM (and then repeated 
with ROA in a second run) and the 
nine independent factors using the 
dynamic GMM estimation procedure. 
We expected, given the superior 
estimation property of GMM, to have 
a significant relationship between the 
performance and determining factors. 
We tested this using the Wald tests. As 
explained earlier in this section, results 
were taken from different runs of the 
GMM to verify the superiority of the 
two versions of the procedure.
 Hypothesis 3: There is no significant 
effect from any of the nine determining 
fac tors  on  bank performance. 
Obviously this null hypothesis was 
expected to be rejected for most, if 
not all, the independent variables. 
Prior research suggested a majority 
of the factors would have a significant 
influence on performance measures 
(ROA; PSM).
FINDINGS ON THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN PERFORMANCE AND 
DETERMINANTS
This section summarises the findings of 
this study. First, we present the results for 
the whole sample of 100 banks over eight 
years. In the next sub-section are the results 
from testing the relationship separately for 
two samples of banks in high-income and 
low-income countries. 
Whole Sample
The results of the regression runs are 
summarised as shown in Table 4 for the 
whole sample. First, we examined the results 
from OLS regressions first for PSM and 
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then for ROA before interpreting the more 
accurate GMM results. The OLS test results 
and parameters were biased estimates of the 
more accurate estimators to be found in the 
four columns marked as GMM for the PSM 
and ROA runs. The model fitness statistics 
are shown in the bottom panel of the table.
We first examined the bottom panel 
of the table. The R-squared values were 
above 50% in the OLS regressions for both 
PSM and ROA performance measures. This 
means there was a significant relationship 
between bank performance and the nine 
determining factors. The fact that more than 
half the variations in the PSM and ROA were 
explained by the nine significant variables 
gives strong support to reject the null of H1 
and accept the alternative explanation.
Examining the individual factor effect 
on the performance from among the nine 
factors, one factor, LR, and another, 
CONCEN, were found to not significantly 
influence the PSM or the ROA. For these 
two non-significant factors, the probability 
values were larger than 0.10 so we accepted 
the null hypotheses, that there was no effect. 
The reason for including the GMM 
estimators shown in the GMM-results 
columns was to see if the corrections for 
possible errors known to exist in the OLS 
regressions would lead to more accurate 
estimators. It can be seen that there was 
improvement in the overall results. The 
Wald statistics are all significant, which 
is evidence of a relationship between 
performance and the identified factors. An 
examination of the GMM results showed 
that the statistics from the Wald tests were 
all significant. That shows that there was 
a significant relationship between bank 
performance and the set of nine determining 
factors for our tests on participation banks. 
This was true for both runs using the PSM 
and ROA. Further, the PSM and ROA 
results also showed significant relationship 
for these banks over the eight-year period 
tested. 
A number of findings on the individual 
factor effects on performance are reported 
in the table. First, the non-bank-specific 
factors, which were shown as significant in 
the OLS estimates, were not significant in 
the GMM tests. Obviously, the coefficients 
suggested that the bank-specific factor 
results were all significant, except for the 
one for LTA (size).  Further, the size of 
banks was not significant; neither was 
capital adequacy (CA) although the latter 
was significant in the OLS regression. The 
important finding in the GMM result was the 
more accurate estimations by the dynamic 
GMM runs; only the bank-specific factors 
had an influence on performance (except 
for size and capital). Second, unlike in 
previous research findings found in the 
literature, industry concentration as well as 
macroeconomic factors were not important 
for performance over the eight-year test 
period for the participation banks.
The overall results supported a strong 
relationship between banking performance 
and five bank-specific variables. These 
variables were: liquidity risk (LR), credit 
risk (CR), asset quality (AQ), management 
efficiency (ME) and income diversification 
(ID). All other factors were not relevant for 
Participation Bank Performance Determinants
1007Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 25 (2): 1 - 1018 (2017)
Table 4 
Correlation coefficients between independent variables 
PSM ROA PSM
OLS
ROA
OLSTwo-step system 
GMM
Two- step system 
GMM with SE
Two-step system 
GMM
Two-step system 
GMM with SE
Lag Dependent Variables for Dynamic Modelling
PSM L1 0.606*** 0.606***
(10.52) (0.058 (4.120) (0.147)
ROA L1 0.246*** 0.246**
(7.140) (0.034) (2.320) (0.106)
Bank-Specific Variables
LR 0.012*** 0.012* -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.000
 (2.880) (0.004) (1.830) (0.007) (-0.200) (0.003) (-0.110) (0.005) (0.890) (0.003) (-0.150) (0.003)
CR -0.084*** -0.084** -0.312*** -0.312*** 0.018 -0.173***
 (-5.120) (0.016) (-2.430) (0.035) (-9.320) (0.034) (-2.780) (0.112) (0.910) (0.020) (-9.760) (0.018)
CA 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.004*** 0.008***
 (1.560) (0.002) (0.760) (0.005) (1.180) (0.002) (0.480) (0.005) (3.670) (0.001) (7.730) (0.001)
AQ -0.022 -0.022 -0.069*** -0.069 -0.035*** -0.078***
 (-1.400) (0.016) (-0.650) (0.033) (-4.690) (0.015) (-1.320) (0.052) (-4.120) (0.008) (-10.430) (0.007)
ME -0.303*** -0.303*** -0.509*** -0.509*** 0.096** -0.587***
 (-8.640) (0.035) (-3.400) (0.089) (-13.00) (0.039) (-3.110) (0.164) (1.980) (0.048) (-13.730) (0.043)
ID 0.061 0.061 0.852*** 0.852*** -0.167** 0.685***
 (0.650) (0.095) (0.320) (0.192) (9.760) (0.087) (5.140) (0.166) (-2.370) (0.070) (11.300) (0.061)
LTA -0.707*** -0.707** 0.245 0.245 -0.077 0.175***
 (-4.670) (0.151) (-2.390) (0.296) (1.200) (0.205) (0.650) (0.375) (-1.110) (0.069) (2.860) (0.061)
Non-Bank-Specific Variables
CONCEN -0.008* -0.008 -0.002 -0.002 -0.008 0.004
 (-1.680) (0.005) (-0.930) (0.008) (-0.890) (0.003) (-0.800) (0.003) (-1.510) (0.005) (0.840) (0.005)
GDPG -0.011 -0.011 0.011 0.011 0.026 0.055***
 (-0.950) (0.012) (-0.700) (0.016) (1.040) (0.011) (0.600) (0.019) (1.080) (0.024) (2.590) (0.021)
INF -0.030 -0.030 -0.016 -0.016 0.074*** 0.068***
 (-1.310) (0.023) (-0.880) (0.034) (-1.310) (0.013) (-0.730) (0.023) (4.320) (0.017) (4.470) (0.015)
Dum- 0.122 0.122 0.287 0.287 0.628*** 0.477**
time (0.410) (0.297) (0.300) (0.402) (1.600) (0.179) (1.000) (0.286) (2.650) (0.237) (2.280) (0.210)
R-squared 0.540 0.660
F-statistic 7.530*** 92.890***
Wald test 828.100*** 119.530*** 27360.570*** 1178.730***
Sargan test 22.869 25.207
(P-Value) (0.117) -2.342 (0.066) -1.574
AR(1) test -2.812 (0.019) -1.705 (0.115)
(P-Value) (0.005) -1.783 (0.088) -0.436
AR(2) test  -1.926 (0.075) -0.480 (0.663)
(P-Value) (0.054) (0.632)
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Values in the parentheses are Z-statistics and standard 
error, respectively. The Hansen test is a test of over-identification restrictions. Arellano–Bond orders 1 and 2 are tests for first- and 
second-order correlation, respectively, which asymptotically N (0, 1), test first-difference residuals in the system’s GMM estimation. 
Two-step errors are computed according to Windmeijer’s (2005) finite-sample correction
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performance, as were the macroeconomic 
and industry factors.   
Findings on Sub-Samples 
The results of repeating the regressions 
with data from two separate samples are 
presented in this sub-section (See Tables 
5 and 6). The two samples were created 
by dividing the whole sample into high-
income-country banks and low-income-
country banks. Income per capita was used 
to classify the two samples. The results were 
obtained using the same software and are 
summarised in the same manner as in the 
case of the whole sample.
A priori, it is reasonable to assume 
that the banking systems in low-income 
economies are likely to experience greater 
demand for bank-related intermediation 
than would be the case for high-income 
economies. It is well known that high-
income economies tend to be less bank-
dependent for funding needs because 
borrowers resort to direct markets for funds 
more so than in low-income economies. 
Low-income economies have greater 
cyclicality in demands for funds as their 
GDP growth is more volatile. Hence, 
banks in low-income economies more 
so than those in high-income economies 
may experience influence from non-bank-
specific factors, and these factors may 
help to produce statistically significant 
coefficients. The summary results relating 
to high-income economies in the sample are 
given in Table 5. 
As in the case discussed in relation to 
the whole sample, it is evident there is a 
significant relationship between individual 
bank performance and the set of independent 
factors for the high-income sample results. 
The F-ratios from OLS regressions and 
the Wald test values for the GMM runs are 
all statistically significant (See the bottom 
panel of the table). Further, in the case of 
the OLS results, the R-squared values were 
more than 50%, so more than 50% of the 
variations in the performance variables are 
explained by the models. 
The results of the GMM runs indicated 
that non-bank-specific factors did not 
have a significant influence on bank 
performance. Almost all the coefficients on 
non-bank-specific factors were insignificant 
with probability values higher than 0.10. 
However, the OLS regression results had 
probability values on half the tests below 
the 0.10 levels. It is possible to recall 
and thus infer from the discussion in the 
methodology section that these OLS results 
may not be reliable given the potential 
biases in estimations. Thus, we accepted the 
GMM-based statistics as suggesting that the 
non-bank-specific factors were unlikely to 
have a material influence on performance. 
Out of the 16 cells of test results on non-
bank-specific factors from GMM runs, only 
two (GDP and CONCEN) were slightly 
significant, so we disregarded the two sets 
of acceptable statistics to conclude that 
those factors did not add materially to bank 
performance. 
Participation Bank Performance Determinants
1009Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 25 (2): 1 - 1018 (2017)
Table 5 
Regression results for panel data model (GMM) and OLS, using NIM and ROA as dependent variable – 
high-income Countries 
PSM ROA PSM
OLS
ROA
OLSTwo-step system 
GMM
Two- step system 
GMM with SE
Two-step system 
GMM
Two-step system 
GMM with SE
Lag Dependent Variables for Dynamic Modelling
PSM L1 0.728*** 0.728***
(16.97) (0.043 (7.340) (0.099)
ROA L1 0.273*** 0.273*
(7.750) (0.035) (1.880) (0.145)
Bank-Specific Variables
LR 0.011*** 0.011* 0.005* 0.005 0.008** 0.007*
 (3.580) (0.003) (1.680) (0.007) (1.840) (0.003) (0.580) (0.008) (2.05) (0.039) (1.840) (0,004)
CR -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.201*** -0.201* 0.030 -0.155***
 (-5.770) (0.011) (-2.730) (0.024) (-6.790) (0.029) (-1.780) (0.113) (1.45) (0.021) (-7.890) (0.019)
CA 0.003* 0.003 0.005*** 0.005 0.006*** 0.007***
 (1.670) (0.002) (0.800) (0.003) (3.600) (0.002) (0.700) (0.008) (4.710) (0.001) (6.080) (0.012)
AQ -0.011 -0.011 -0.110*** -0.110** -0.036*** -0.077***
 (-1.230) (0.009) (-0.460) (0.023) (-13.600) (0.008) (-2.090) (0.053) (-3.04) (0.012) (-6.820) (0.113)
ME -0.372*** -0.372*** -0.605*** -0.605*** -0.074 -0.646***
 (-19.31) (0.019) (-9.840) (0.038) (-14.540) (0.042) (-3.270) (0.185) (-1.32) (0.056) (-12.23) (0.053)
ID 0.242*** 0.242 0.999*** 0.999*** -0.153* 0.747***
 (2.830) (0.086) (1.160) (0.308) (14.140) (0.071) (5.890) (0.169) (-1.90) (0.080) (10.10) (0.074)
LTA -0.030 -0.030 0.162 0.162 0.293*** 0.333***
 (-0.230) (0.132) (-0.080) (0.365) (0.890) (0.182) (0.390) (0.418) (2.970) (0.099) (3.580) (0.093)
Non-Bank-Specific Variables
CONCEN 0.008 0.008 0.027** 0.027 0.028** 0.017
 (0.960) (0.009) (0.590) (0.014) (2.060) (0.013) (1.250) (0.022) (2.440) (0.012) (1.540) (0.011)
GDPG -0.020* -0.020 0.009 0.009 -0.011 0.057**
 (-1.900) (0.010) (-1.270) (0.016) (1.030) (0.009) (0.530) (0.017) (-0.40) (0.027) (2.290) (0.025)
INF -0.035 -0.035 -0.016 -0.016 0.035 0.031
 (-1.630) (0.022) (-0.830) (0.042) (-1.310) (0.012) (-0.620) (0.025) (1.550) (0.023) (1.460) (0.021)
Dum- 0.463** 0.463 0.271 0.271 1.278*** 1.007***
time (1.960) (0.236) (0.980) (0.470) (1.360) (0.199) (0.680) (0.398) (4.450) (0.287) (3.730) (0.270)
R-squared 0.560 0.660
F-statistic 6.740*** 68.690***
Wald test 1204.550*** 372.110*** 293462.240*** 5626.840***
Sargan test 18.713  25.385  
(P-Value)  (0.284)  ( 0.063)  
AR(1) test -2.000 -1.941 -1.388 -1.249
(P-Value) (0.046 ) (0.052) (0.165 ) (0.212)
AR(2) test  -1.032 -0.962 -0.087 -0.074
(P-Value) (0.302) (0.336) (0.931) (0.941)
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Values in the parentheses are Z-statistics and standard 
error, respectively. The Hansen test is a test of over-identification restrictions. Arellano–Bond orders 1 and 2 are tests for first- and 
second-order correlation, respectively, which asymptotically N (0, 1), test first-difference residuals in the system’s GMM estimation. 
Two-step errors are computed according to Windmeijer’s (2005) finite-sample correction
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That leaves the interpretation of the 
results on the seven bank-specific factors 
in the upper panel of the table. Of the 32 
cells with GMM-derived statistics on bank-
specific factor effects, all but the LTA (size) 
have probability values below 0.10. That 
means the GMM model results helped to 
identify that six of the seven bank factors 
were significantly correlated with the bank 
performance in the high-income countries. 
The results from OLS runs – though 
with some errors in estimations – also 
suggested that six of the seven variables 
significantly influenced bank performance 
as INF for inflation was not significant in the 
OLS runs. It can thus be concluded that all 
except one bank-specific factor appeared to 
have significant correlation with PSM and 
ROA as two performance measures. 
The results for the low-income countries 
are summarised in Table 6. Similar to the 
results for high-income countries, the low-
income country banks appeared to have a 
significant influence from the independent 
variables on their performance outcomes 
as measured by the GMM regressions. One 
variable, namely LTA (size of banks), out 
of the 10 right-hand side variables was not 
at all statistically relevant for performance. 
LTA coefficients all have probability values 
higher than 0.10, so this factor did not 
influence performance. The results from 
OLS regressions appeared to contradict the 
more accurate statistics from GMM runs: 
the LTA factor was significant, but the 
LR (liquidity risk) was not significant for 
performance. Pushed to make a choice, the 
OLS results were decided as being biased, 
so we accepted the GMM results that ‘size 
of bank’ was not relevant for performance.
As for the non-bank-specific factors, just 
as we had reasoned, some had coefficients 
that were statistically significant. They 
were CONCEN (industry concentration) 
and INF (inflation) factors. For the low-
income country banks, these two factors 
significantly affect bank performance. For 
example, a 1% change in inflation would 
affect performance by 0.51 to 0.62%. The 
GDP (income) variable was not significant, 
although the low-income countries did have 
higher volatility in GDP growth, and this 
may, in fact, be thought to be a relevant 
factor. Perhaps GDP’s insignificant effect 
was due to the period of our tests over 
the recent eight years. The low-income 
countries did not experience high GDP 
growth in that period.
Bank Performance Persistence
Impact of lagged dependent variables is 
frequently used to ensure that performance 
persistence is taken into account in 
performance study models (See Goddard et 
al., 2011). Researchers specify the lagged 
dependent variable in the GMM models used 
in recent years in order to enable a dynamic 
estimation of the model as is also done in 
this study. The overall results suggest that 
there is persistence in performance (Please 
refer to Table 4 for the whole sample). The 
previous year’s performance values on 
PSM and ROA variables were statistically 
significant, so a dynamic relationship was 
taken into account. 
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Table 6 
Regression Results for Panel Data Model (GMM) and OLS, Using NIM and ROA as Dependent Variable – 
Low-Income Countries  
PSM ROA PSM
OLS
ROA
OLSTwo-step system 
GMM
Two- step system 
GMM with SE
Two-step system 
GMM
Two-step system 
GMM with SE
Lag Dependent Variables for Dynamic Modelling
PSM L1 0.009 0.009
(0.090) (0.096) (0.040) (0.198)
ROA L1 0.174*** 0.174
(5.960) (0.029) (1.400) (0.124)
Bank-Specific Variables
LR 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.004
 (5.460) (0.002) (3.290) (0.003) (0.530) (0.003) (0.250) (0.007) (0.370) (0.006) (-0.780) (0.005)
CR 0.047 0.047 -0.418*** -0.418** 0.044 -0.461***
 (1.190) (0.039) (0.460) (0.101) (-7.060) (0.059) (-1.970) (0.212) (0.530) (0.083) (-7.080) (0.065)
CA 0.019*** 0.019* 0.015*** 0.015** 0.007*** 0.011***
 (3.680) (0.005) (1.750) (0.011) (4.280) (0.004) (2.100) (0.007) (3.110) (0.002) (5.870) (0.002)
AQ -0.024** -0.024 -0.030*** -0.030 -0.012 -0.043***
 (-2.010) (0.012) (-0.870) (0.028) (-3.720) (0.008) (-1.150) (0.026) (-0.930) (0.013) (-4.160) (0.010)
ME 0.747*** 0.747** -0.110 -0.110 0.747*** -0.393***
 (7.300) (0.102) (2.060) (0.363) (-1.020) (0.108) (-0.450) (0.246) (8.780) (0.085) (-6.030) (0.065)
ID -0.420*** -0.420* 0.706*** 0.706*** -0.101 0.729***
 (-3.370) (0.125) (-1.830) (0.230) (9.010) (0.078) (3.010) (0234) (-0.720) (0.141) (7.410) (0,098)
LTA -0.276 -0.276 0.750* 0.750 0.295* 0.254*
 (-0.700) (0.395) (-0.460) (0.598) (1.900) (0.394) (0.970) (0.770) (1.760) (0.167) (1.960) (0.129)
Non-Bank-Specific Variables
CONCEN -0.020*** -0.020** -0.005** -0.005 -0.007 0.004
 (-5.780) (0.004) (-2.260) (0.009) (-2.200) (0.002) (-1.490) (0.003) (-1.050) (0.007) (0.800) (0.005)
GDPG 0.002 0.002 -0.022 -0.022 0.058 -0.072*
 (0.200) (0.010) (0.070) (0.028) (-0.700) (0.031) (-0.330) (0.066) (1.080) (0.054) (-1.710) (0.042)
INF -0.062*** -0.062 -0.051*** -0.051 0.081*** 0.019
 (-3.250) (0.019) (-1.330) (0.047) (-4.570) (0.011) (-1.280) (0.40) (2.620) (0.031) (0.770) (0.024)
Dum- 0.894*** 0.894** 0.490* 0.490 0.245 0.009
time (5.330) (0.168) (2.270) (0.393) (1.880) (0.261) (1.100) (0.447) (0.750) (0.325) (0.040) (0.253)
R-squared 0.480 0.820
F-statistic 10.850*** 52.670***
Wald test 2993.500*** 303.850*** 31381.890*** 1218.480***
Sargan test 12.106 9.219
(P-Value) (0.743) (0.904)
AR(1) test -1.841 -1.109 -1.925 -1.772
(P-Value) (0.066) (0.267) (0.054) (0.076)
AR(2) test  -1.530 -1.401 1.190 0.986
(P-Value) (0.126) (0.161) (0.234) (0.324)
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Values in the parentheses are Z-statistics and standard 
error, respectively. The Hansen test is a test of over-identification restrictions. Arellano–Bond orders 1 and 2 are tests for first- and 
second-order correlation, respectively, which asymptotically N (0, 1), test first-difference residuals in the system’s GMM estimation. 
Two-step errors are computed according to Windmeijer’s (2005) finite-sample correction
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PSM as the market-based measure (as 
will be the case using NIM for mainstream 
banks) revealed that the persistence of 
participation banks was as high as 0.6 
(with t-values all in excess of 2.000) on the 
previous year’s PSM values. That would 
appear to suggest that the participation 
banking system is largely not fully 
competitive. If it were fully competitive, 
we would have the lagged coefficient closer 
to zero than closer to one as in this case. 
Even if measured by ROA, the values are 
closer to 0.25. Obviously for the purpose of 
measuring persistence in performance, the 
market-based measure of PSM (or NIM) 
revealed the fuller extent of previous year’s 
performance largely influencing the current 
year’s performance. 
The numbers for the high- and low-
income countries also revealed the same 
trend, as seen in Tables 5 and 6. The PSM 
coefficients of high-income countries have 
lag coefficient values as high as 0.72 while 
the corresponding numbers for ROA is as 
low as 0.20. It is possible that the use of 
market-based PSM reveals the full extent 
of performance persistence to be three times 
higher compared to the number revealed by 
the ROA, which is a smoothed number4. 
In the case of low-income country 
samples, the results revealed the effect of a 
different regulatory control prevalent in such 
countries. Banks in low-income countries 
are guided by the central banks that receive 
orders from the government to promote 
socially-directed investments, often with 
controls on what the banks could charge for 
such directed lending practices. Given that 
this phenomenon is widely known in the 
literature, it is unlikely that the performance 
measures would have persistence as high as 
in open economies, for example, as reported 
for the high-income countries. Thus, the 
coefficients on the lagged PSM are not 
significant: the values are around 0.09 with 
low t-values to be significant. The ROA 
coefficients are statistically significant in 
one case and not significant in another case. 
These too are unlikely to be of economic 
significance since the values are very low, 
at 0.17.  
CONCLUSION
This paper, in reporting interesting findings 
on a new type of bank (participation banks), 
started with the aim of finding whether a 
significant relationship could exist between 
bank performance factors and a set of 
factors reported to be correlated with bank 
performance. Profit-share contracting 
by participation banks is new and has a 
short history. These banks collectively 
have some US$4,700 billion in assets in 
some 50 countries. Participation banks 
work alongside the much more established 
mainstream banks, which price deposits 
and lending costs on interest rates. The test 
models we applied were an advanced model 
based on the widely used older model by 
Ho and Saunders (1981). More specifically, 
we used the current panel data regression 
method with refinements to overcome 
some deficiencies as found in the relevant 
econometric literature. 4 See Footnote 1. 
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Our findings pointed to a number of 
valid conclusions relating to this new form 
of banking. To start with, the net interest 
margin is not possible for this type of bank, 
so we used the equivalent ‘profit-shared 
margin’ as a market-based measure of bank 
performance. To that variable, we added the 
much older return on assets as a profitability 
measure. On the other side of the equation 
were seven bank-specific variables and three 
non-bank-specific variables widely used in 
banking studies over the last eight years. 
We also used a time dummy to eliminate the 
effect of the global financial crisis during 
some years. 
Next, we found that the OLS-method-
based tests showed that both bank-specific 
and non-bank-specific factors were all 
statistically correlated with the profit-share 
and return-on-assets measures. One bank-
specific factor, namely, liquidity risk, was 
not significant to the relationship. However, 
when more accurate test statistics were 
obtained using the GMM panel regressions, 
only the bank-specific factors (excepting 
bank size) were all significantly correlated 
with the two bank performance measures. 
The third result was that the banking 
system is not fully competitive as is evident 
from the significant persistence of current 
performance on past performance. The 
degree of persistence was as high as 0.72 
for high-income-country participation 
banks. Finally, for the low-income-country 
banks, there was a strong impact of inflation 
affecting bank performance: 1% inflation 
affects performance by 0.5%. We found 
a high degree of explanatory power of 
the model with more than 50% explained 
variation in the test statistics. 
The data set we used was from an 
established source, so it is possible to extend 
this study over different test periods other 
than the one we used as the post-global-
crisis period. Further extension of this study 
is possible to compare results in this paper 
with new results from a matched pair of 
mainstream banks in the same 25 countries. 
To sum up, the motivation of this 
study was to identify different performance 
measures in order to investigate if their 
performance measure(s) are correlated with 
known bank-specific and non-bank-specific 
factors.
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Figure 1. Average cost/income ratio for 100 Islamic banks over the years 2007 to 2014 
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